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The Python’s Embrace: Clinical Research Regulation by
Institutional Review Boards
Subject consent and its waiver are critical topics in contemporary
research. Institutional review boards (IRBs), acting under the wary
eye of the Ofﬁce for Human Research Protections (OHRP), typically
may waive consent when research involves no more than minimal
risk, waiver would not harm the subjects, and the research would be
impracticable without the waiver.1 IRBs constrict research when they
cautiously interpret “impracticable” to mean “impossible” and insist
on consent. And, in an ironic twist, IRBs can thus injure the vulner-
able groups they imagine they are protecting.
A disturbing pair of articles by Rich and his colleagues, one from 20102
and the second in this issue of Pediatrics,3 demonstrate how this
works. SUPPORT, the parent study, investigated the impact of different
respiratory care regimens on lung disease, retinopathy, and survival
in premature infants born between 24 and 27 weeks’ gestational
age.4,5 Eighteen IRBs reviewed the protocol; all required that consent
be obtained, even though these interventions are routinely provided
without speciﬁc consent in everyday practice. This study reveals 3 of
the resultant costs.
The ﬁrst cost is time and money. Obtaining consent drained $200 000
from the project, and if 75% of the eligible but not enrolled infants
had been included, recruitment would have been completed in 18
instead of 48 months. The requirement for informed consent also led
to the second, predictable6 cost of biased trial entry. Compared with
mothers of infants enrolled in the trial, mothers of infants not en-
rolled were less likely to be white, insured, have a high school ed-
ucation, and have received prenatal care. As the article in this issue
demonstrates,3 their infants were also more likely to die.
African American infant mortality in the United States is double that of
white infants.7 The IRB system’s stated goals include the pursuit of justice
and the protection of vulnerable groups; yet the SUPPORT ﬁndings—
fruits of the hard work of physicians and nurses at 18 major medical
centers over 4 years—are, as a result of IRB action, more applicable to
white infants than to black infants.
The IRB system’s third cost, and its greatest error, is hidden in plain
sight: patients die while better treatments are still in development.
During the years SUPPORT was delayed, neonatologists, awaiting the
trial ﬁndings, knew less about how to save infants in their care from
respiratory failure, blindness, and death. Collins et al8 ﬁrst articulated
the fundamental issue at work here—that when regulation delays
lifesaving research, lives are lost. Schneider and I have conﬁrmed the
estimate of Collins et al that consent-related delays in research in heart
attack treatment in the 1980s cost thousands of lives.9 Beauchamp10
recently made a similar point, noting that OHRP’s delay of the Keystone
initiative to reduce ICU infections, if continued, might have caused
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unnecessary patient deaths. To Ding-
wall,11 a British sociologist, 1 cost of
ethics constriction of his study of why
physicians and nurses reuse single-
use medical devices is “the lives that
will not be saved.” And, Heimer has
said, “The biggest ethical lapse in
American regulation of human sub-
jects research is the death and suf-
fering that has resulted from slowing
the pace and altering the focus of re-
search and squandering research
funds.”12 These are serious charges,
but no defender of the system has
argued that Collins, Beauchamp,
Dingwall, Heimer, or Schneider and I
are mistaken. Just as a python’s victim
shows no outward signs of trauma,
biomedical protocols appear little
changed by regulatory constriction. But
IRB regulation of clinical research costs
lives as surely as the python’s embrace.
We can intelligently discuss a system of
social control only if we understand its
nature. This system, comprising OHRP
and the IRBs it regulates, functions as
a federal regulatory agency. Its work-
ers are employed by a variety of fed-
eral, state, and private institutions,
but federal regulations created IRBs,
a federal ofﬁce oversees them, and
IRBs refer to federal law to justify their
actions. Like any governmental inven-
tion, this system’s merits and defects
should be scrutinized and its value
vigorously debated. Although its de-
fenders invoke ethics to justify its ex-
istence and impeach its critics,13–15
this system is not intrinsically moral,
nor is its existence mandated by past
abuses. No special shield protects it
from folly or error.
Thirty years ago, Levine16 estimated
that IRBs cost $130 000 000 per year,
and asked the right question: “What do
we think we are buying with all this
money?” The answer requires the
same analysis we would make of any
other agency. A legitimate regulatory
system produces societal beneﬁts that
exceed its costs. Ethicists have left the
costs and beneﬁts of the IRB system
untouched, but this vacuum has begun
to be ﬁlled by experts in law and public
policy. At a symposium at Northwest-
ern University School of Law in 2007,
Hyman17 stated that “there is no em-
pirical evidence that IRBs have any
beneﬁt whatsoever,” and Zywicki18
concluded that the system’s costs
“substantially exceed” its beneﬁts.
No proponent of this regulatory regi-
menhassteppedforwardtorebut these
charges. Instead, there are calls for
reform,19,20 including proposals by
the federal government itself.21 But if
Hyman17 and Zywicki18 are correct, the
logical response to the system’s fail-
ings is not reform. The logical response
is abolition.
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DOES ICE DESERVE THE COLD SHOULDER?: Last week, my son pulled a muscle
while playing soccer. He immediately applied ice to the skin over the muscle.
When he got home he noted that his muscle did not hurt much but that the entire
area around the pulled muscle was completely numb and walking felt odd. Within
a week, he was playing soccer again but his actions made me wonder whether
there is any data to support the use of ice for the treatment of athletic muscu-
loskeletal injuries. According to an article in The New York Times (Blogs: January
4, 2012), despite the widespread belief that ice is beneﬁcial, little data exists to
support it. A review of the topic in 2004 concluded that icing decreased pain but
could not ﬁnd strong evidence for any other beneﬁt. Since then, a small ran-
domized trial did not ﬁnd any beneﬁt to icing muscle injuries. Injured muscles
that were iced did not heal faster and weren’t less painful than injured muscles
with no ice applied. More recently, a review of more than 30 studies concluded
that icing helped decrease the pain associated withmuscle injury by numbing the
area. However, icing was also associated with reduced muscular strength and
power, impaired ﬁne motor coordination, and even occasionally impaired pro-
prioception. Most of these effects were short lived, e.g. 15 minutes or so after the
ice was removed. Interestingly, athleteswho immediately returned to competition
after icing, found it detrimental to their athletic performance. Athletes who iced
for 20 minutes could not run as fast, jump as high, or throw a ball as well.
Whether icing actually leads to an increased risk of injury in athletes who rapidly
return to competition was not examined. Why athletes have impaired perfor-
mance after icing is unknown. Possible explanations include reduced nerve
conduction velocity or altered muscle-tendon mechanics. So what are the
implications for the average weekend warrior? For those who exercise and ex-
perience muscular skeletal pain afterwards, ice is an inexpensive and effective
way to decrease pain. For those highly competitive athletes who are seeking to
return to play, waiting several minutes after the ice has been removed may be
prudent.
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